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 ABSTRACT 
 
The present study is an analytical investigation of the impact of rebellions on the process of 
democratization in the DRC. It is concentrated principally on the Ceasefire Agreement signed 
in 1999 in Lusaka (Zambia) between main rebel groups, central government, opposition 
political parties, civil society and representatives of countries involved in conflict. The 
stipulations of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement which provided the Inter-Congolese Dialogue 
widely affected the course of events in many ways. This study assesses with rigor whether 
rebellions in the DRC hindered or catalysed the process of democratization. 
Opportunity approach is selected as the theoretical framework of this study; it gives a variety 
of tools to analyze the dimensions of the political environment which provides incentives for 
leaders to initiate actions that can affect their expectations. The tools of historical and 
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qualitative analysis of different texts of various Scientifics and non-Scientifics have been 
used in this study. Different aspects of rebellions and the process of democratization in the 
DRC have been analyzed comprising the process of democratization before the rebellions of 
1996-1997 and those of 1998 which culminated in the signature of the Lusaka Ceasefire 
Agreement by all belligerents. 
The result of this study stipulates that, rebellions in the DRC played a catalytic role in 
boosting the process of democratization by pushing the central government to agree on the 
Inclusive Global Accord which provided a transitional government composed of main rebel 
groups‟ representatives; central government and opposition political parties. This adds proof 
to scientific findings that democratization is connected with possible diminution of rebellion, 
as well as co-relation between that stage of development and democracy in combating 
rebellion (Morrisson, 2003). Recommendations are made at the end of this study in order to 
tackle obstacles that could obstruct the process of democratization in the DRC. 
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1 BACKGROUND AND OUTLINE 
Africa has a history of rebellions which date back to the territorial defence against Colonial 
regimes. In the post-independence period, rebellions have emerged as a defence against 
totalitarian regimes and political inequality. In the post-cold war periods, many African 
countries hosted rebel groups in their territories claiming that, their military interventions aim 
to restore democratic governance, justice and equality in societies.  
This explains why many authoritarian oligarchic regimes in Africa (both civilian and 
military) have been obliged by the impulsion of mass discontent, popular protests, and public 
demonstrations to multiparty governance in the political arena (Iman, 1992:102-105). Snyder 
and Mahoney (1999: 103), perceived the concept of regime as an interactional structure of 
political institutions both formal and informal. Any change can appear on the regime when 
institutions are reconfigured by actors. Regime institutions play a preponderant role on the 
ability and conduct of incumbents who force to protect them and, it appears also that regime 
institutions impact the way that those who want to challenge them in seeking transformation. 
The Democratic Republic of Congo is one of the countries afflicted by recurrent rebellions 
and armed conflicts, beginning with the bid of mutiny in army and cessation by Katanga and 
Kasai provinces supported by the Belgian government in 1960, immediately after 
independence from Belgium. As a result, the DRC went into chaos and anarchy which led to 
many events such as, the first UN intervention urged by the DRC government. As Stated De 
Witte (2001:8), on 12 July 1960 after the secession of Katanga, the Congolese authorities sent 
a telegram to the UN urgently requesting military aid against the presence of external 
aggression. The isolation of Lumumba through is assassination in 1961; the emergence of 
provisional national government in 1965, and the demise of Mobutu‟s regime in 1997, the 
DRC has truly been the stage of rebellions and armed conflicts.  
 Rebellions have been considered by those who felt oppressed by incumbent regimes as one 
of the pressurizing tools that they can utilized  against the central government. This study 
aims to delve into two periods of intense activity by rebel movements, from 1996 to 1998 and 
from 1998 to 2005, which mark the challenge of democratization process, by rebel 
movements and armed conflicts.   
The democratization process in the Zaire/DRC began earlier on with the speech of President 
Mobutu in April 1990 and was accelerated by rebellion which started in the Eastern DRC, 
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and progressed in the massive and large insurrection as many allied forces and countries from 
the region supported the insurrection to get rid of president Mobutu‟s regime. As a result, an 
allied force was formed namely the Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du 
Congo-Zaïre (AFDL), and received support from Angola, Zimbabwe, Rwanda, Uganda and 
Namibia. They chose a former Zairian rebel leader Laurent Kabila, who had fought Mobutu 
since 1961 when Lumumba has been assassinated. He became the leader after overthrowing 
Mobutu, and immediately the country changed the name from Zaire to Democratic Republic 
of Congo in 1997. 
 In 1998, reproaching president Kabila as a "corrupt dictator, and incapable of conducting 
reforms which could lead to democracy and peace in the DRC and in the region, the coalition 
which overthrew Mobutu split as a result of a misunderstanding between Kabila and some 
regional countries who helped him to get rid of Mobutu. The Congolese Rally for Democracy 
(RCD), has been formed  with the aim to get rid of Kabila‟s regime, with support from other 
rebel groups such as the Movement de Liberation of Congo (MLC) of Bemba (Mwaniki, 
2009). 
 It was under these circumstances that the Lusaka Ceasefire Accord was signed in July -
August of 1999 by all belligerents. The Accord was the net outcome not only of efforts of 
third-party (the then OAU and UN), it included factors on ground. In fact it was a time where 
both sides could not reach their objective of getting rid of their opposition. As a consequence, 
all parties saw the way of negotiations as the only way to draw political advantage with the 
Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, which called for national dialogue and reconciliation.  The key 
conflicting parties (rebel groups and the central government) had agreed to do their utmost to 
facilitate the inter-Congolese political negotiations which they expected should lead to a new 
political dispensation in the DRC. 
In essence, the rebellions in the DRC imposed significant pressure on the central government, 
which served not only to open a dialogue between the parties in conflict and make a way for 
the “Lusaka Accord” but also the enhancement of the process towards democratization in the 
DRC. Beyond the known destructive aspect of the rebellions in the DRC, the conflict created 
an opportunity to advance the social and economic interests of the people of the DRC. 
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1.2 Preliminary Literature Study and Reasons for Choosing the Topic 
Although the literature on rebellion is expanding, their overall effects or impacts on the 
democratization process have remained under-appreciated and under analysed. However, the 
reality remains that the rise of rebellions and conflicts, especially in Africa, has engendered 
scientific inquiries on the link between rebellions and democracy. 
Many studies explore mainly the root causes of rebellions. Generally, such studies contend 
that rebellions erupt mostly where there is deep social inequality and a lack of effective 
democratic institutions. . As indicated above, many studies examine the negative impact of 
rebellions on the process of democratization. These studies suggest that the promotion of 
democracy in Africa is congruent with dependency .The DRC benefited as well from aid 
from the international community especially, during the period post the Lusaka Ceasefire 
Agreement. As pointed out by Gambino (2001:5), during the year of 2001, the DRC seemed 
to be in danger of serious civil war as army forces from several African countries were 
supporting directly either rebel movements or central government. After the assassination of 
Kabila, the political environment changed when Joseph Kabila took the reign and showed 
positive signs of leading the country toward reconciliation and elections, as well as the 
engagement with the west, including the international financial institutions. Positive 
responses to the development of situations on the ground had been noticed. The diplomacy 
had become effective and the International Community engaged to work toward peace in the 
DRC with a huge mandate of intervention by MONUC, to support president Kabila‟s 
negotiations with rebel leaders. All these factors combined helped to create a transitional 
government of large unity in 2003, and, consequently, successful national elections in 2006. 
It was in this context that substantial aid flowed from bilateral and multilateral sources. 
In his study, Scarritt (1997:801) analyzed the interaction between democracy and ethno-
political protest and rebellion in Africa over approximately three decades between 
independence and the democratization wave of the 1990s. He goes as far as to demonstrate 
that ethno-political protest has neither the positive consequences for democratization that 
worker-student protest has nor the negative consequences that violent rebellion has.  He 
assumed that a pattern of rebellion, associated with the long-standing absence of competitive 
participation, may have had the opposite effect. 
Some other studies focus on ethnic conflicts as major causes of rebellions. Morrison (2003:3) 
analyses the circumstances in which democracy can have an effect on ethnic rebellion and as 
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well, the circumstances in which ethnic rebellion can affect democratization.  He found that 
“rebellions have negative effects on democracy and that the effects vary in line with the level 
of development a country has achieved”. Among the most developed countries, the 
relationship is strongest; but as the level of development declines, the effect of rebellion on 
democracy also declines. Ethnic rebellion has the greatest negative impact on democracy in 
the most complex, underdeveloped societies. 
Collier and Rohner, (2008:531-540) argued that democracy constrains the technical 
possibilities of government repression, and this makes rebellion easier, they believe that when 
income is high, it creates favourable conditions for rebellions. They came up with findings 
suggesting that as democracy increases political violence process in rich countries, it 
decreases rebellion in developed countries and increases it in developing countries. 
Nzongola (2006:224) focuses on the question of the nature of the armed conflict in the 
Democratic Republic of Congo. Is it a civil war, as consistently reported by the international 
media, or is it a war resulting from foreign aggression, as indicated by the authorities in 
Kinshasa? He maintains that the reasons which led to the conflict in the Great Lakes region 
may shed light on the likelihood of peace and democracy in the DRC.  However, it is worth 
considering the three key factors which led to the crisis the country is currently experiencing: 
The breakdown of state structures resulting from the corruption of the Mobutu regime; the 
genocide in Rwanda and its repercussions on the region and the expansionist outlook of 
Rwanda and Uganda. The complexity of the situation in the DRC and the multiplicity of 
actors involved, provoke debate between scholars about what went on in the DRC. Was it 
civil war confirmed by some, foreign aggression as Nzongola Ntalaja (2006:223) pointed out, 
ethnic conflict or a revolution questioned by AFDL leaders to justify their movement? 
Somehow all these denominations are reflecting on what happened in the DRC. This study 
opts for rebellion as it is recognized in the Lusaka Agreement (1999), as an opponent 
involved in peace agreement.  
Most of the literature above, retraces generally the negative impact of rebellion on the 
democratization process. However, the points raised by these authors do not mention the 
catalytic role of rebellion on the democratization process enough, which, this research intends 
to look at more deeply. As Arendt (1970:236-244) wrote, “Violence is always about the 
destruction of the old, it is never about the construction of the new; yet, the conflicts and 
activities in which violence is involved are not always purely destructive. In destroying, 
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violence can also keep things in place; it can even set in motion change and the construction 
of the new”. It is in this context that the study is aligned, and in this regard, the contribution it 
makes to the thorough analysis of the impact of rebellion on the democratization process 
focusing on the catalytic role they play on democratization.  
1.3 Research Problems and Objectives: Key Questions to be asked 
This study seeks to excavate and analyse the negative aspects of rebellions in relation to the 
positive and shows how rebellions act as a catalyst to the process of democratization in the 
DRC.  
The main objective of this study is to examine and critically evaluate the impact of rebellions 
in the democratization process in the DRC.  Specifically, the broader will encompass the 
following:  
- To examine the impact of rebellions on the process of democratization in the DRC; 
- To evaluate critically the process of democratization since the 1999 Accord signed by 
all belligerents involved in the conflict; 
- To find out whether rebellions constitute a hindrance or catalyst to the process of 
democratization in the DRC; and 
- To find out how rebellions in the DRC contributed to the advancement of the 
democratic process. 
1.4 Research Questions 
This study aims to address four main questions: 
1.  What is the impact of rebellion on the process of democratization in the DRC?  
2. What critical evaluation can be drawn from process of democratization since the Ceasefire 
agreement of 1999? 
3. What is the extent to which rebellions can be considered to constitute a hindrance or 
catalyst to the democratic process in the DRC? 
4. What is the Impact of United Nations Interventions on conflict in the DRC? 
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1.5 Principal Theories upon Which the Research Project will be constructed 
This dissertation seeks to examine whether rebellions constitute a hindrance to the process of 
democratization or play a role of catalyzer in putting pressure to the ruling movement in 
order for them to accelerate the democratization process. Although the democratization 
process started earlier in the 1990s, it had been interrupted with the demise of Mobutu‟s 
regime, which marked also the rise of rebel movements.  This study will look at both the 
negative and positive impact of rebellions on the process of democratization with more 
emphasis on the catalyst aspect of rebellion on the process of democratization in the DRC.  
 In order for us to understand clearly the impact of rebellion on the process of 
democratization, it is pertinent to analyze not only theories of democratization, but it is 
important to look at theories that could give explanations of the causes of rebellions. Many 
interesting theories have emerged to comprehend the rise of rebellions, among them we have 
competition theory, and according to Morrison (2003:66), Competition theory defends the 
fact that a group of people are coming into contact with others, especially when that contact 
is created by economic resources which also sort of creates competition. The results are that 
as competition appears, the group that prevails tries to keep their authority and power over 
those economic resources. 
 
 In recent academic and policy research, the conflict in the DRC has often been presented as a 
prominent example of how violent struggles over natural resources have shaped internal 
warfare (Vlassenroot and Raemaekers, 2004:386). Attention was paid in this regard to the so-
called “illegal” exploitation and trade of the Congo‟s natural resources. Several UN and other 
reports spoke of the existence of “elite networks” that were reportedly engaged in the 
systematic plundering of the wealth, and which potentially could make the Congo one of the 
most prosperous nations in the world: diamonds, gold and coltan were mined and exported 
from the different rebel-occupied areas in return for arms and cash to finance the country‟s on 
going civil war (Raeymaekers, 2007:24). These natural resources created a competition 
between rebel groups. As a consequence, the DRC was divided into several administrations. 
A third of the country was under Kabila‟s control, a third under the control of rebel 
movement called the Rally Congolese for Democracy (RCD) and almost another third under 
the Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC). 
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Theories of competition suggest also that competition is high if the structures that maintain 
the systems are broken (Olzak 1998:187-217). As a consequence, the possibility of political 
competition prevailing in the conditions of it is political flux and after a time that old political 
environments break and new ones are constructed. Rebellion and ethnic conflict happen most 
of the time when those different categories of people in the country start competing in the 
same environment where there is opportunity and easy accessibility to political, social and 
economic advantages. In these conditions, the possibility of conflict occurring is especially 
more likely when the divisions of labour and traditional political systems are not any more 
culturally sustainable. (Olzak1998:187-217). This theory helps to understand the motive of 
competition among social categories in a society and the consequence that competition 
presents in a time of crisis. At the same time, this theory is limited in the sense that the battle 
for natural resources among ethnic groups may incite political instability which could lead to 
violence and ethnic conflict and makes the path of democratization difficult. 
Another theory which further tries to explain the resurgence of rebellion is Elite Persuasion 
Theory. As Snyder (2000:288), argues that nationalism does not exist or is inconsistent until 
democratization starts operating and elite‟s start to emphasize nationalism to protect their 
position. Nationalism itself suggests mechanisms that elites can use to rule and engage 
people. There is lack of internal cohesion among Congolese leaders; it sees the need of 
nationalism which puts ethnic appurtenance behind it in order to facilitate the transition of the 
democratization process. The main challenge that has always confronted the Congolese state 
is to establish a state with the capacity and authority to could peacefully manage internal 
conflicts, serve the general population‟s basic needs more effectively, and be seen as 
legitimate by the population (Lund and Wolpe, 2005:23).  
Calling for the protection of a group of people‟s rights implies a well-defined threat coming 
from outside of the group as an invader and this could constitute the motivation for exclusion 
from any activity considered as political. It appears that this kind of nationalism developed by 
elites can cause violent conflict in the sense that those who feel excluded as a group could 
lead to the possibility of defending themselves against marginalization. Elite Persuasion 
Theory has some limitations, in the sense that some elitists, instead of creating cohesion and 
calling for cohabitation between different ethnic groups, create competition among ethnic 
groups which results in conflict. Since 1960, the DRC has been facing the challenge of 
nationalism where political parties were formed according to clan and ethnic affiliation 
except the Movement National Congolais (MNC) of Lumumba which had a spirit of 
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nationalism and had been blocked in several events to operate normally until the death of 
Lumumba. On the other side there is still a category of people who is still denied by the rest 
of the population; the Congolese people although the constitution recognizes them. It appears 
that this situation can only end up in rebellion and ethnic conflict. 
The Theory of Dependency is a category of theories that place emphasis on international 
dependency as a strong cause of rebellions. For instance Boxwell and Dixon (1990: 540-559), 
investigated whether international dependency incites rebellious political violence directly by 
mobilizing anti-imperialist and xenophobic movements, and indirectly by increasing relative 
deprivation and repression of nonviolent protests. Using a four-equation model, they 
examined the effects of dependency on rebellion independent of domestic causes, and then on 
three primary domestic determinants; income inequality, economic growth, and regime 
repressiveness. Their model includes economic dependence and military dependence, the 
latter measured by arms supply concentration and controls for the legacy of colonialism. 
Findings indicate that both forms of dependency promote rebellion through their effects on 
the domestic class and state structures  The DRC economy has always been largely dependant 
on aid, donation and military intervention of foreign countries, Since the beginning of the 
second wave of rebellions and conflicts in 1996, the intervention of the international 
community has been increased in various ways and both parties involved in conflict (central 
government and rebel groups) depend on various allied countries which  also benefit from the 
conflict. This theory helps us understand the impact of dependency on the structures and 
function of the country. However, it is difficult to evaluate objectively it‟s impact on the 
process of democratization. 
Political Opportunity Theory will be used to analyze the impact of rebellions on the process 
of democratization. As Tarrow (1994:85) defines political opportunity as aspects of a 
political environment that can arrange incentives for people to take collective action which 
affects their future that can bring success or failure. Basically, Political Opportunity Theory 
entails that an increase in the variation in rebellions and in ethnic protests depends 
consequently on the manner of political inclusion (Kriesi 1995: 0). All the parties who 
endorsed the Lusaka agreement in 1999 showed their determination to create an environment 
favourable for collective action and for making the process of democratization possible. It has 
resulted that as the country was becoming progressively tolerant politically, the incidence of 
violence and rebellions decreased steadily. The regimes which present a high degree of 
repression are supposed to have less opportunity for the occurrence of violence and 
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rebellions. The systems that are inclusive will re-enforce the participation of all conventional 
means. In this situation, the condition of democracy does not need to be linked negatively 
with violence and rebellions. Political Opportunity Theory entails that the greater the 
government is inclusive, the less violence and rebellion should occur. Thus Opportunities can 
include a variety of events and circumstances such as “regime shifts, periods of political 
instability, or changes in the composition of elites” all of which may provide “openings” for 
social movements to take hold and gain traction (Della Porta 2008:223).The Dialogue 
provided by the Lusaka Accord seen as the cornerstone of the Lusaka Agreement has been 
instrumental for peace and facilitated the process of democratization in the DRC. 
1.6 Research Methodology and Methods 
This study will opt for historical and qualitative approaches. According to Gerring (2001:37) 
a good research design is characterized by plenitude, comparability, independence, 
representativeness, variation, analytic utility, reliability, mechanism, and causal comparison. 
The usefulness of the historical approach is to help us understand the historical basis of the 
DRC‟s rebellions. It will help to test the main hypothesis with regard to their causes and 
effects on the process of democratization in the DRC. 
The ways in which an academic discipline makes use of research methods is influenced both 
by its objectives and by its limitations (Burnham. et al, 2004: 5). As mentioned previously, 
many researches of rebellions tend to focus on their negative aspects, especially with regard 
to their impact on democracy and the process of democratization. It serves as a boundary for 
this research, which sees more the catalyst aspect of rebellions on the process of 
democratisation.  
Choosing between two different methods which promise to yield equally valid data, the 
researcher is likely to reject the more time-consuming or costly method (Webb E.J and all, 
1169:32). With that in mind, this study will be based on qualitative and historical 
methodologies.  As stated by Babbie and Mouton (2001:270), qualitative research aims at 
gaining in-depth knowledge about the context of participants in the research. Qualitative 
methodology is seen as an appropriate approach for this study in the sense that it seeks to 
understand the role played by rebel groups in enhancing or hindering the process of 
democracy in the DRC. 
16 
 
The historical methodology, as stated by Busha and Harter (1980: 90), entails the “systematic 
collection of data which is preceded by the objective evaluation of information related to past 
events so as to test hypotheses in regards to their causes and effects in order to be able to 
explain the present trends and have focus on the future”. Historical methodology has great 
value in the sense that it will help to have a good understanding of political history of the 
DRC by reviewing all the big events which have a direct link with this work and, from there, 
extract the distant causes of rebellions. The efficacy of the use of the historical approach goes 
beyond helping us to understand the historical basis of the DRC‟s rebellions; it will help us 
test the main hypothesis with regard to their causes and effects in the process of 
democratization in the DRC, which will enable this study to identify and explain the current 
trends.  In choosing the way to conduct research, the scientist, as any other scientist, is in the 





CHAPTER TWO:   LITERATURE REVIEW 
2.1 Democratization process in the DRC 
One of the most difficult challenges in studying democratization has been reaching agreement 
on what “democracy” is (Coppedge.M, 2012: 11-12,). Democracy has been defined in 
hundreds of ways, however, almost all definitions fit into one of four overlapping models: 
participatory democracy, representative, liberal, and deliberative democracy.  A good 
characteristic of democracy has to include all the aspects cited above. It is well argued and 
well defended that development is a concomitant aspect of democracy.  
Liberal democracy which is an accommodation of liberalism and democracy is mostly and 
properly about the reconciliation and aggregation of predetermined interests under the 
auspices of a neutral set of rules (Dryzek, 2002:11). What simplifies the accommodation is 
the fact that Liberalism and Democracy have substantially connected to each other in the 
sense that Liberalism requires that the masses assume their proper role and thus embrace the 
rule of a directing minority (Vazquez-Arroyo, 152). Thus, modern democracy today is more 
related to liberal democracy. 
Participatory democracy for instance, is self-government by citizens rather than 
representative government in the name of it citizens (Barber,1984), it implies that active 
citizens govern themselves directly here, not necessarily at every level and in every 
circumstance, but frequently enough and in particular when basic policies are being decided 
and when significant power is being deployed. Self government is carried out through 
institutions designed to facilitate ongoing civic participation in agenda-setting, deliberation, 
legislation, and policy implementation. Strong democracy relies on participation in an 
evolving problem-solving community that creates public ends. 
Representative democracy called also decision making by discussion among free and equal 
citizens, is founded on the idea that, deliberation can at best mean discussion among a small 
number of speakers before an audience rather than discussion among all members of the 
assembly. It may mean the process of genuine deliberation where the aim is to persuade the 
interlocutor rather than an audience (Elster (ed), 1998:6).  
Concerning deliberative democracy, scholars present extensive overlap of definitions. 
However, we retain for this work the definition given by Gambetta, and he defines 
deliberative democracy as “a conversation whereby individuals speak and listen sequentially 
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before making a collective decision”. Deliberative democracy is based on the idea that 
political decisions should turn not on the force of members but on the force of the better 
argument (O‟Flynn) 
 In their efforts to explain the varied dynamic and performance of new democratic regimes 
resulting from the “third wave” of democratization, scholars have focused extensively on 
political institutions. 
Despite the fact that institutional factors rule big interest by those analyzing the achievement 
of the process of democratization which arises in Africa since the 1990‟s, they have 
principally played a serious role in revealing authoritarian regimes. The study of transitional 
democracy during the last three decades has been commanded by analyses that concentrated 
on dependent leadership, possibly by choice. (Snyder and Mahoney, 1999: 104). Thus, 
democratization empowers citizens to an option regime which is nondemocratic. Therefore, 
democratization is characterized by a set of electoral, institutional and procedural criteria 
which must be extended in a broader conceptualization (Joseph, 1989:365).  In the late 1980s, 
the wind of change was blowing throughout the world and especially on the African 
continent. People were demonstrating against their authoritarian leaders and demanding 
democracy with almost the same vehemence as they claimed independence (Mangu. 
2009:431). Democratization has been activated with the so called “second liberation” in 
Africa which started with the era of multi-party governments that led to an election in Benin 
which ended up with the defeat of the president who led the country to a multiparty system. 
Malawi and Zambia replicated this process the same year. These elections raised expectations 
and held out the prospect of restoring democratization as well as improving governance all 
over the continent. The first liberation in Africa is referred to the Transitional period from the 
colonial era to period of independence that occurred in the continent. Most of transition to 
democracy in Africa has not been marked by the breakthrough of a founding election that 
brought a definitive end to dictatorial regimes and an association of political reformers to 
power (Barkan, 2006:11-18). 
 Democratization is the process of gradually introducing elections and the creation of a civil 
society supportive of tolerant, pluralistic politics through adherence to constitutionality 
enshrined rules of the game. Thus, it involves bringing about the end of an autocratic regime. 
Democratization would design a radical bottom-up process of change initiated and controlled 
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by the masses of the people; it requires a deliberate construction of democratic political 
institutions (Mangu, 2002:295). 
The DRC did not make exception to that wind of democracy that swept Africa, Nzongola, 
(2002:186) pointed out that, in his speech of 24 April 1990, Mobutu announced surprisingly 
that he abandoned the single-party system and Prunier (2009:77) adds that, the turning point 
was the year 1990, when the whole system started to go awry. Mobutu had had opponents 
before but never any structural threat to his regime. Moreover, when his death came in 1997, 
it was followed by a period of armed conflict and rebellion that delayed again the 
democratization process somehow. 
There are divergent views as to whether or not rebellions are a hindrance or catalyst to the 
process of democratization. Some scholars highlight the fact that the process to 
democratization itself creates an environment permissive to the outbreak of rebellions and 
armed conflicts by inducing exclusionary nationalism and polarization in the society. If 
democratization increases the risk of conflict, it creates a dilemma for external democracy 
promoters as well as for the country that are considering undertaking democratization 
(Sarvun and Tirone, 2011:233-246). Mobutu and his entourage decided to pretend that they 
were in favour of democratic reforms, while doing everything possible to obstruct the 
democratization process (Zongola, 2002:186).  
In this regard some scholars are interested in whether the propensity for civil war of 
democratizing countries which receive democracy aid, is lower than that of countries that 
receive little or no aid. In other words, they assess whether democracy aid can provide 
political stability in a fragile environment. (Rueschemeyer and Stephens in Joseph, 1997:371) 
make the external efforts to promote political reform (democratization) as a fundamental 
component of their theoretical framework, they identify three “power clusters” as being the 
most significant in determining democratic transition: an external one; the state; and domestic 
classes and class coalitions. They contend that a balance of power beyond a country‟s borders 
determines the chance of democracy. They further propose that democracy assistance 
programs can provide a potential constraint on the risk of domestic political violence. That is, 
even if a state does not have strong institutions to manage the democratization process, 
democracy aid can provide an exogenous source of state strength, stability, and institutional 
credibility to smoothen the transition. 
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 Di Palma (1990:2) focuses on the approach of democracy whereby decisions are made by a 
few people in authority rather than people who are affected by decisions. He also 
acknowledges the impact of external factors which can favour or impede democratization. He 
identifies “a new force”: the direct exportation of democratic powers with global, regional or 
colonial clout that must be taken into account. There are scholars who recognize the 
interaction between democratization, rebellions and armed conflicts such as Morrison et al 
(2003:800-827).  Their observation is based on the fact that if democratization is not placed 
in an adequate political system, it can be a cause of continuing conflict and consequently 
hinders more advanced levels of democratization. Scarrit et al (2001:801), analyzed the wave 
of democratisation of 1990‟s in Africa and found out that there was a possibility of conflict 
occurring as a last resort in more autocratic countries. 
Although the tenet of establishing democratic institutions started earlier on with the speech of 
Mobutu on 24/April/1990, and despite the fact that a National  Sovereign Conference has 
been held to put in place democratic institutions, the democratization process was really 
reinforced by the signing of Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement in 1999. As Rogier. (2004:26) 
stated the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement resulted after military power positions reached a 
stalemate: the armed groups had to concede their inability to overthrow President Laurent 
Kabila and, Kabila had also not succeeded to neutralize the armed groups. It is in this 
particular situation that the curiosity to know and to analyze whether either side hindered or 
catalyzed the process of democratization in the DRC or it came to intensify the crisis of 
democratization which started earlier in 1990s.  
 
The surging effects of conflicts in the DRC, which reached a climax in 1998, culminated in a 
need for national dialogue between rebel groups and the central government. For instance, the 
Lusaka Agreement of 1999 stipulated that: 
 
“On the coming into force of the Agreement, the Government of the DRC, the armed opposition, namely, the RCD and MLC 
as well as the unarmed opposition, shall enter into an open national dialogue. These inter-Congolese political negotiations 
involving les forces vives shall lead to a new political dispensation and national reconciliation in the DRC. The inter-
Congolese political negotiations shall be under the guidance of a neutral facilitator to be agreed upon by the Congolese 
parties. All the Parties commit themselves to supporting this dialogue and shall ensure that the inter-Congolese political 
negotiations are conducted in accordance with the provisions of Chapter 5 of Annex “A”. Which treat the modalities of 




The DRC democratization process was specifically negotiated into the peace accords to 
establish a legitimate government and to consolidate peace through full participation of 
parties involved in conflict. Thus, the new constitution enacted in 2006 has changed the 
country‟s governance system and called on many democratic reforms. This constitution sets 
the framework of the Congolese democratization process by transforming the relationship 
between institutions, people and communities on the one hand, and power and responsibility 
on the other (Mwaniki, 2009). By bringing together the Kabila government, the rebels, the 
unarmed opposition, and civil society organizations, the dialogue represented yet another 
attempt since the CNS2 (Conference Nationale Souveraine 2) Conference to put the 
democratization process back on track. Such process led at the very minimum to the 
restoration of the liberal democracy regime of the early 1960s, which is far better than the 
absence of any democracy (Zongola, 2002:264). 
 
2.2   Rebellions in the DRC 
Describing rebellion in Africa, Bujra (2002:6), stated that rebellion by armed groups outside 
the military establishment of a country and which aim to overthrow a government are the 
most common type of political conflict in most African countries. There are authors who try 
to distinguish between rebellion, Revolution and armed group. 
Gurr and Goldstone in Helta(2008:2), give a definition of revolution based on the French 
Revolution as “ a political struggle led by people united, can transform totally the political 
order which guide the lives of people, as well as the economic and social structures of the 
community.” Thus, Revolution can be considered a sudden destruction of a social class 
dominant after a political struggle of another social class considered to be oppressed. Rebel 
movements are those groups that intend to overthrow the regime in place and bring a 
revolution but are still battling to do so (Katz in Heleta 2008:2). It is sometimes difficult to 
make a distinction between political revolution and rebellion. According to the Oxford 
Dictionary of sociology (1998), the term “Revolution” could be used when revolutionary 
movements overthrow the regime in place and make fundamental changes in a society. 
Rebellion seems to be more restricted to political change, affecting only the replacement of a 
regime by another without affecting social and economic structures of the society. Hence, 
Russell (1974:56) considers rebellion as a violent struggle that menaces to overthrow a 
regime by violence and fighting.  The DRC did not make an exception, starting from the first 
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rebellions up until now, it has been noticed that rebellions in their actions, aim effectively 
either to overthrow or destabilize central government in order to gain a chair into 
negotiations. 
 The fact that rebellion has begun to cause more problems in term of political, social and 
economic destabilization, it has started to receive much more sustained attention from 
scholars. Since the wind of democratization that invaded African countries in the 1990 which 
was characterized by dictatorial regimes, rebellion was utilized by certain groups to force 
dictatorship regimes to embark on a process of democratization. Mkandawire (2002:181-215) 
argued that, “to understand the actions of the rebel movements and their violence, we must 
understand not only the elites and the intra-elites conflict that produce their leaders, but also 
the wider population (2002: 182). We need to know on the one hand, the nature of the rebel 
movements, the thinking, composition, actions and capacities of the leaders of the insurgent 
movements and on the other hand, the social structures of the African countryside in which 
they often operate”. Rebellion in the DRC is a complex phenomenon that involves a variety 
of actors and causes, which are interpreted and handled differently and as a consequence, are 
perpetuated. 
 
Talking about rebellions in the DRC, Many literatures are focusing  on explaining they root 
causes and they courses , Autesserre (2010:47) stated that, one of the causes of  rebellions in 
the Democratic Republic of Congo is the spill over of the Rwandan genocide. Many others 
such as, Prunier (209:24), Nzongola (2002:217), sustain this view. From April to July 1994, 
Hutu extremists massacred more than 800.000 Tutsi‟s and moderated Hutu‟s. When the 
Tutsi‟s Rwandan Patriotic Front seized power in Kigali and ended the genocide, about 
2million (mainly Hutu) Rwandan refugees flooded the eastern Congo to avoid persecution 
from their new Tutsi government. 
The new Tutsi regime in Rwanda had to find a way to dismantle these rebel groups. 
Nzongola (2006:226) observes that the Rwandan genocide occurred in 1994, at a time when 
the Mobutu regime was collapsing and the country was ungovernable. With a dysfunctional 
government, stripped of its legitimacy and facing popular resistance, the DRC was powerless 
to stop the genocide or deal effectively with its repercussions within the country. Both the 
Hutu‟s and the Tutsi‟s were to benefit significantly from the situation in the DRC. The Hutu‟s 
took advantage of the weakened defence force (Zaire Armed Forces or ZAF) and established 
bases in the DRC. That was one of the fundamental causes and the starting point of the 
second phase of rebellions in the DRC and we align this work mainly to this cause.  
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However, scholars present many other causes of rebellions in the DRC such as Collier and 
Hoeffler (1999), who consider the act of rebellions as a “looting sector”.  This was 
corroborated by Vlassnroot (2008:5) who stated that, economic interests are believed to be a 
dominant cause for the protracted nature of the Congolese conflict and the fragmentation of 
rebel groups. Due to the fact the Congolese wars were self-financed, this led to a mutation in 
the character of violence. At the same time, this is said to have provoked a systematic 
criminalization of warfare, as rebel movements increasingly engaged in illegal economic 
activities and linked up with transnational criminal networks in order to export locally 
generated resources. Furthermore, Vlassnroot states that the explanation advanced by 
economists including significantly, World Bank economists, who argued that the violence of 
rebel movements in Africa as a social action derived from an individual‟s calculation of self-
interest and personal gain. 
 The DRC formerly Zaire has often been portrayed as the epitome of African State collapse 
“a forsaken black hole characterized by calamity, chaos, confusion” (Trefon, 2004). Started 
earlier on after the struggle of Independence in 1960 with chaos that resulted with the 
assassination of the elected Prime Minister Patrice Lumumba and later on with the first phase 
of rebellions 1961-1964, The Congolese civil wars (1996-1997; 1998-2003) have been 
amongst the worst humanitarian disasters of the twentieth century. Starting with the 
“democratization” of the Mobutu regime in the early 1990s, the consecutive confrontations 
between Mobutu and the AFDL („Alliances des Forces pour la Libération‟) led by Laurent-
Désiré Kabila, and between Kabila and the different Congolese rebellions transformed the 
DRC into one of the most conflict-ridden places on the globe (Raeymaekers T, 2007:23).  
 Kristof (2011:43-70) in his distinction  between “opportunistic” and “activist” rebellions he 
said that, opportunistic rebellions emerge from resource rich environments or with support 
from outside patrons who keep all the benefits to themselves and who commit high levels of 
violence against the local population. In contrast, activist rebellions emerge in resource-poor 
contexts, and its participants commit fewer abuses while also employing violence selectively 
and strategically. Weinstein (2006:12), gives us more explanation on the difference between 
opportunistic rebellions and activist rebellions. He says in opportunistic rebellions, the 
participant is in it more for short-term material interest, and less out of ideology. In activist 
rebellion, participants are in it out of dedication to the cause of the organization and in which 
short term gains are unlikely. Although this opportunistic behaviour is considered as realizing 
short-term material interest and maximum benefit , de Jong (2013:17), explains this is the 
behaviour of most of rebel groups that operate in the DRC as rebel forces are not only  
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concentrated on predation. Somehow, it was noticed that the political economy of resources 
not only produced powerful centrifugal forces that further fragmented the state, but they were 
also involved in the processes of negotiation and accommodation. As Christopher 
Clapharm(1998b) cited by Mkandawire (2009:182) commented, “Insurgencies derive 
basically from blocked political aspirations and in some cases also from reactive 
desperation”. 
In this work, I assigned myself to avoid the controversy that surrounds the causes and nature 
of conflict and rebellion in the DRC, and look at the impact of those rebellions on the process 
of Democratization. 
2.2.1 Overview of the History of Rebellions in the DRC 
Rebellions which erupted in 1996 in the Eastern DRC is not the first phenomenon in the 
conquest of power in the DRC, it can be traced back earlier after independence was gained in 
1960 with a conflict of power between President Joseph Kasavubu and his prime minister 
Patrice Lumumba who was assassinated in 1961. As noted by Nzongola (2002:121), Patrice 
Lumumba‟s martyrdom for the cause of genuine independence, national unity and territorial 
integrity gave rise to the first political opposition to the neo-colonial state. 
The reign of President Joseph Mobutu, the dictator who had ruled the Congo since 1965 was 
becoming increasingly unpopular both among neighbouring countries and in Western 
countries. In response, the Rwandan, Ugandan, Angolan, and Burundian governments, as 
well as South Sudanese rebel forces, formed an anti-Mobutu coalition, which engineered, 
armed, and supervised various Congolese rebel groups and local militias. In particular, with 
the support of this coalition, disparate anti-Mobutu forces from the Congo formed the rebel 
movement Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of the Congo-Zaire 
(Raeymaekers T, 2007: 47).  As Nzongola (2002:225) observes, “the fall of Mobutu came as 
a consequence of the drive by the new Rwandan authorities against Hutu extremists in the 
Congo. In order to deal with the threat posed by the interahamwe, ex-FAR soldiers had taken 
refuge across the border”. 
 Between September and November 1996, the rebellion progressively evolved into a full-
scale national and regional conflict, now known as the first Congo War. The AFDL (Alliance 
de Forces Democratique pour la Liberation) toppled Mobutu to install their spokesperson, 
Laurent Desire Kabila. The new president did not have much time to savour his victory 
though as tensions soon arose between Kabila and his foreign backers over his dismissal of 
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his Rwandan ancestry. The governments of Rwanda, Uganda, and to a more limited extent 
Burundi, engineered a new rebel movement, the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD) in 
August 1998 and launched an attack on Kabila‟s government, thus initiating what has become 
known as the second Congo War. This new rebellion was supposed to conquer the Congo in a 
few months, in part through support from the neighbouring countries that backed the AFDL. 
However, it met an unexpected opposition of forces from Zimbabwe, Angola, Namibia, and, 
to a lesser extent, Chad and Sudan; each sided with Kabila for different political, security, or 
economic reasons. 
 
In mid-1999, Kabila‟s troops managed to halt the rebels advance. The stalled peace process, 
which had resumed a few days after the beginning of the 1998 war, leaped into action at the 
time. The United States, UN, European Union (EU), and several of its member states  notably 
France, Belgium, and the United Kingdom, as well as the Organization of African Unity and 
several African countries in particular, South Africa, Zambia, and Libya, acted as mediators, 
even while in some cases supporting one of the Congolese armed groups (Raeymaekers 
T,2007, 49). 
These mediators took advantage of the stalemate that had emerged, and Angola, the Congo, 
Namibia, Rwanda, and Zimbabwe signed a cease-fire agreement in Lusaka in July 1999 
(Autesserre, 2010). 
 
Bujra (2002:6-7), added that, these rebellions are generally initiated by urban elites who are 
dissatisfied with the way the government had treated them and their region or ethnic group. 
They mobilize a section of their regional or ethnic supporters; acquire arms clandestinely and 
are often supported by a neighbouring country and sometimes by an outside power as well. 
Initial grievances of the leadership of such a rebel group would vary from being blocked from 
achieving political power. Under representation of their region, ethnic group in the 
government and administration, their region was deliberately denied  access to development 
funds, to block their ethnic groups from the private sector, and the allocation of their land to 
other ethnic groups (of the ruling ethnic group), (Bujra,2007:6-7) These are reasons always 
advanced by rebel leaders to justify their position. As a result of Laurent Kabila‟s 
authoritarianism, and also of a crisis within Alliance (AFDL), he was brought to power in 
May 1997. The DRC was again confronted with a rebellion in August 1998; the consequence 
was a crumbling DRC State into several administrations. A third of the country fell under 
Kabila‟s control, a third under the control of the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD) and 
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almost another third under the Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC). The remaining 
territory was administered by small rebel groupings that split off from the RCD, the best 
known being the RCD- National (RCD-N) and the RCD-Liberation Movement (RCD-ML), 
Mangu.M (2002:457). 
2.3 Regional Development and International actor’s implication in DRC’s 
Conflict 
The involvement of the International Community in the DRC‟s conflict dates back from 
1960, when Prime Minister Lumumba, requested UN intervention to end secession of the 
Katanga  and Kasai region that cost as well the life of it‟s General Secretary Dag 
Hammarskjold. Nzongola (2002:258) describes that intervention as “The first major UN 
peacekeeping force of the postcolonial era”. The controversial nature of the first UN 
intervention and generally the International Community involvement in the DRC‟s have been  
one of the subjects which raised  international political debates during the period of 1960s-
1970s . 
Did the international community actually take action to end conflict and war in the DRC 
which started in 1996? Questioning Prunier yes and no, he said that it all depends how one 
defines action. The international community tried to offer the picture of various actions 
mainly via UN Resolutions, in the same way that the United States wanted to be seen as 
recovering a clean soul and in condemning exactions on the ground by belligerents, while 
France was offering up its tottering grandeur (Prunier, 2009-343). The two major powers 
involved in the region are the United States and France. Since both have a strategic interest in 
rare metals, they wanted to see their transnational corporations have access to the resources. 
For this reason, and for fear that such resources might fall into the wrong hands, particularly 
those of international terrorist groups, they cannot remain indifferent as to who holds state 
power in the various countries of the Great Lakes region. Another major external actor in the 
DRC is trans-national networks, both legitimate and criminal. As Nzongola observes, the 
more legitimate interests are represented by trans-national mining corporations. Mining trans-
national‟s from around the world have joined their South African counterparts in a new 
scramble for concessions and exploration rights all over Africa. Trans-national mining 
companies and criminal networks are not the only external forces likely to fish in troubled 
waters. The UN panel of experts‟ report has shown that the major interest of Rwanda, 
Uganda and Burundi in DRC is to plunder the country‟s resources. 
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Many efforts have been made to unveil the conflict in the DRC. The U.N. has condemned 
multinational corporations and countries involved in the conflict and called for sanctions 
against countries and individuals involved in the illegal activities. Preventive measures to 
avoid a recurrence of the current situation have been put in place such as reparations to the 
victims of the illegal exploitation of natural resources; design of a framework for 
reconstruction; improvement of international mechanisms and regulations governing some 
natural resources; and security issues.( Batware.B,2011). As stigmatized by Prunier 
(2009:230), what came to be known as the Lusaka Agreement, has a long story behind it and 
it was signed on the 31
st
 of August, 1999.  A good part of that long process was marked by 
differing views of the French and American‟s over what was going on the Congo, be it an 
invasion from Rwanda, Burundi, the Uganda coalition or Rebellion from different armed 
groups in Congo. Resulting from an intricate cluster of internal and external factors, it also 
probably counts among the most complex conflicts, with up to nine military states involved 
on Congolese territory and even more rebel groups brought in (Roger, 2003:25). Because of a 
year long international (mainly African) process that placed great pressure on the 
belligerents, a ceasefire agreement was signed by the Heads of State of the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe and the Minister of Defence 
of Angola on 10 July 1999.This ceasefire agreement was then signed by the Ugandan-backed 
MLC on the 1
st
 of August 1999 and, finally, by 50 people representing both factions of the 
RCD on the 31 August 1999.   
The „Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement‟ only provided for the cessation of hostilities pending a 
political settlement among the Congolese parties themselves. Chapter V of the agreement, 
which defined the parameters of the Inter-Congolese Dialogue (ICD), called for the official 
launch of this process of negotiations, which should lead to a „new political dispensation and 
national reconciliation in the DRC‟. (Rogier, 2003). Lusaka, Gaborone, Addis Ababa, Sun 
City, Pretoria, these are only but a few of the various steps that have marked out the ICD and, 
as the place names testify, have made the ICD essentially an African process. 
 Although controversies surround the implication of International Community on DRC‟s 
conflict, a remarkable effort has been made by the United Nations to end conflict and war 
through various  Resolutions taken by Security Council regarding sanction and  intervention 
on the ground, various International institutions and actors played as well a roll to contribute 
to the effort of the UN to alleviate the conflict which ended up in the Ceasefire Agreement 
being signed in Lusaka in 1999 by all parties involved in conflict. 
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 2.4 Ruanda and Uganda Supports toward main Rebel groups 
The direct support of Ruanda, Uganda and Burundi toward main Rebel groups in the DRC 
has been in the centre of debate in international political discussions about what was going on 
in the DRC, and which engendered conflict even amongst diplomatic relations in the Great 
Lakes region. After denial on several occasions by Rwanda and Uganda‟s of their support 
towards rebel groups in the DRC, the UN via the Security Council came up with many 
resolutions forcing Ruanda and Uganda to withdraw their troops, and recognizing the 
invasion of the Eastern DRC by Rwandan troops (Resolution 1756 of Security Council). In 
order for Rwanda and Uganda to avoid any sanctions from UN, they resolved to start backing 
DRC rebel groups. According to Nzongola(2002:225) to legitimize the move by a coalition of 
Rwanda, Uganda, Burundi and some other countries from the region, to get rid of Mobutu, 
Museveni and Kagame proposed the idea of using Kabila and, by 1996 the AFDL was 
created. It is a well documented fact that the main rebel groups which were involved in 
country conflict were the fabrication of neighbouring countries namely Ruanda and Uganda 
initially to have control over the border in order to protect themselves against their own rebel 
movements, Furthermore, Nzongola (2002:226) highlights that; all military operations were 
the work of Rwandan soldiers and units of Congolese Tutsi‟s trained in Uganda and Rwanda. 
General Kagame himself has boasted about the crucial role Rwanda played in the 1996-1997 
war. In 1998, the decision by Kabila to send Rwandan troops back to Rwanda, was not 
welcomed by Rwandan authorities. Prunier observed (2009:183), that on the 16
th
 of August, 
the rebels went public as the Rassemblement Congolais pour la Democracy (RCD) and 
announced the names of their leaders, well known as representatives of Rwandese interests. 
Since the initiative to remove Kabila from power had failed from the inside, it had to come 
from outside. Just as Rwanda had done in 1996, by first invading the Congo and setting up 
the AFDL to legitimize its action, Rwanda and Uganda initiated the war that erupted in 
August 1998, prior to the founding of RCD, the rebel movement (Nzongola, 2002:228). The 
movement of liberation of Congo (MLC), the third rebel group was created by Uganda in 
November 1998 as a response to the lack of popular support for the RCD in the Congo 
(Nzongola, 2002:231). 
As I argued before, the intervention of Rwandan and Ugandan troops to help rebellions in the 
DRC is not questionable; the reason for their intervention has been discussed above. This 
researcher is more interested in the role played by different rebel groups in the process of 
implementation of democratic institutions in the DRC. 
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CHAPTER THREE: THE IMPACT OF UN INTERVENTION AND REBELLION 
The phenomenon of rebellion is not new in political events of the DRC. As I mentioned 
above early after independence in 1960, the DRC experienced rebellion following the 
assassination of Lumumba in 1961. As pointed out by Mangu (2002:355-356), in 
consequence of the dismissal and later the assassination of Prime Minister Lumumba, several 
loyal members of his government embarked on a rebellion against the central government. 
Antoine Gizenga, deputy Prime Minister in the Lumumba government and Gbenye, Minister 
of interior, fled to Stanleyville (currently Kisangani) to lead a rival government in 1962. 
Between 1963 and1964, Lumumba supporters created a vast rebel movement called Conseil 
National de Liberation (CNL) with the aim of overthrowing the central government in 
Kinshasa. There are similarities between rebellions of 1961 and those of 1996 and 1998: Both 
saw the intervention of the United Nations although the first one ended up with their defeat 
by central government with the support of mercenaries. Another aspect is the fact that, both 
rebellions occurred largely in the Eastern part of the DRC. The differences are, although both 
saw the intervention of UN, the second wave of rebellions saw the intervention of UN with 
the role of mediator between belligerents rather than the first.  
If the UN intervention called the “Lusaka Agreement” had as aim to end rebellions and war, 
the UN intervention of 1960 requested by President Kasa-Vubu and Prime Minister 
Lumumba was a consequence of Belgium military intervention allegedly to protect and 
evacuate Europeans from the Congo following the mutiny in the Force Publique which 
erupted early after Independence. The UN played an important role in the settlement of the 
Congolese crisis between the dismissal of Prime Minister Lumumba and the inauguration of 
the Adoula government, as well as the termination of secessions, democracy and promotion 
of constitutionalism. ( Mangu 2002: 357). 
The second wave of rebellions which started in 1996 with AFDL and the coup of Mobutu‟s 
regime, differs from the first wave in many ways, for instance it experienced rapid expansion 
and was better motivated than the first one. In a short time they managed to control all of the 
country and seize power with a strong support from neighbouring countries. Rebellions in the 
DRC reached a culmination point and attracted the attention of the International Community, 
when in 1998 after the decision of Kabila to send Rwandan troops back to Rwanda, 
(Prunier2009:183), a resurgence of rebellions against the government of Kabila arose and 
created destabilization. Therefore, the country had many administrations managed by 
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different rebel groups, the most prominent being the RCD and MLC. However, the negotiated 
settlements that occurred from the Lusaka Cease Fire Agreement indicated that there must be 
circumstances in which parties were prepared to cut their losses and abandon their previous 
goals. In fact, the Lusaka Agreement from the researcher‟s point of view, exhibited the 
characteristics described in a political opportunity structure. The basic premise is that, 
exogenous factors enhance or inhibit prospects for mobilization, for particular sorts of claims 
to be advanced rather than others, for particular strategies of influence to be exercised, and 
for movements to affect mainstream institutional politics and policy (Meyer and Minkoff 
2004: 1457-1492). 
 The “Lusaka Agreement” created an opportunity to all belligerents involved in conflicts to 
raise their concerns for the purpose of a peaceful transition. They agreed to put their 
differences behind for the interest of territorial integrity of the DRC and allowed the UN to 
monitor and implement the ceasefire.  Rogier ( 2004: 381) pointed out that, the  result of a 
year-long international (mainly African) process that placed great pressure on the 
belligerents, a ceasefire agreement was signed by the Heads of State of the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda and Zimbabwe and the Minister of Defence 
of Angola on 10th July 1999. This ceasefire agreement was then signed by the Ugandan-
backed MLC on 1st August 1999 and, finally, by 50 people representing both factions of the 
RCD on the 31
st
 of August.  However, the „Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement‟ provided for the 
cessation of hostilities pending a political settlement among the Congolese parties 
themselves, through Inter-Congolese Dialogue which provided an opportunity for all 
stakeholders in DRC politics to discuss the future of their country (Apuuli, 2002:66). 
3.1 Lusaka Accords 
The Congolese conflict generated a bewildering array of rapid but incoherent peace making 
responses by a wide variety of actors and States who, at one time, were all bent on ending the 
conflict as soon as possible, especially after the period that followed the rebellion launched 
on the 2
nd
 of August 1998 (Malan and Boshoff, 2002:2). Many initiatives to end conflicts in 
the DRC before the signing of Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement have been undertaken by 
different personalities in the world, such as President Jacques Chirac; Colonel Muammar 
Khadafy and others. Many of those initiatives have failed; some of them traced the prelude to 
more determined initiatives such as the meeting of regional leaders held in Pretoria on 17th 
June 1999, under the leadership of President Thabo Mbeki. The meeting paved the way for a 
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DRC summit which was scheduled for 25
th
 of June in Lusaka for the purpose of signing a 
ceasefire agreement called the „Lusaka Accord‟. 
The aim of this section is to provide a brief background of Lusaka Accord and it‟s selective 
agreements in order to comprehend the role that its played in bringing all belligerents 
together, which is something that previous initiative‟s of ending conflict in DRC failed. 
Therefore, the Lusaka Accord paved the way of the democratization process. 
3.1.1 Background of the Lusaka Accord 
As I indicated previously, many attempts to end conflict in the DRC have been initiated 
before by several people and international and regional organizations, but all of them could 
not afford to unite belligerents at the same table like the Lusaka Agreement did. As indicated 
by Mangu (2002: 386) a result of Kabila‟s authoritarianism that brought him to power in May 
1997, the DRC was confronted with a rebellion from August 1998 and the crumbling of the 
DRC State into several administrations. A third of the country fell under Kabila‟s control, a 
third under the control of the Congolese Rally for Democracy (RCD) and almost another 
third under the Movement for the Liberation of Congo (MLC).The remaining territory was 
administered by small rebel groupings that split off the RCD, the best known being the RCD-
National (RCD-N) and the RCD-Liberation Movement (RCD-ML). 
The signing of the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement in Lusaka, Zambia, took place three times, 
on the 10
th
 of July, the 30
th
 of July and on the 31
st
 of August 1999 respectively. The 
agreement was negotiated within the framework of Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) under the chairmanship of the former Zambian president Frederick F 
Chiluba. Duly authorized representatives of the DRC government, the RCD, and the MLC as 
well as non-violent opposition and civil society signed it. Foreign States directly involved in 
the DRC conflict, namely Angola, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, and Zimbabwe, were 
represented as observers. Zambia, SADC, the OAU and the UN witnessed the signing. The 
Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement was endorsed by the UN under article 52 of the UN charter on 
regional arrangements dealing with matters relating to the maintenance of international peace 
and security that are appropriate for regional action. It had a very slow pace of 
implementation due to President Laurent Kabila‟s opposition to a number of its provisions 




Joseph Kabila revived the process of implementation of the Lusaka Agreement and recalled 
the facilitator whose office in Kinshasa had been sealed off by his father (Mangu, 2002:459). 
3.1.2 The Effect of Lusaka Accord on Alleviating Rebellions 
 As Morrison (2003-21) stated, most of the transitions in the democratic process in Africa are 
the result of negotiation, compromise, and agreement under mediation.  Since most 
transitions were negotiated, any overt conflict had to be suspended before negotiations could 
take place. Rebellions in the DRC reached a certain point where, it was difficult to imagine 
any scenario that could help to end conflict, despite the intervention as I mentioned earlier, of 
the International Community and neighbouring countries which instead of bringing a kind of 
relief, exacerbated the conflict in the sense that they aligned themselves to different parties in 
conflict. The Lusaka Accord is the only agreement that united all belligerents in conflict and 
their backers. It has provided a range of dispositions that helped the DRC to solve its conflict 
which turned the country in what some scholars called the “Congo War” (Prunier, 2009). 
From article 1, which provides the cessation of hostilities between Rebel movements, Central 
government, including countries that were backing these groups, to article 3, which provides 
the principles of the agreement, and in it‟s section 19, it provides a mechanism of the 
implementation of transitional power and instauration of democratic institutions. The Lusaka 
Accord came to the rescue of a disastrous situation which the DRC was going through. As 
pointed out Kabemba and Kibasomba (2003:2), one of the key positive element‟s of the 
Lusaka Peace Accord, was the recognition of the territorial integrity of the DRC. The Lusaka 
Accord advocated a democratic inclusive government in the DRC with civil society playing a 
key role and a common security regime among countries in the region by halting any 
assistance to, and collaborating with “negative forces”. The Lusaka Accord proposed the 
formation of a Joint Military Commission (JMC), to facilitate the disarmament of all armed 
groups and the formation of a national army. The Joint Military Commission was to receive 
assistance from the United Nations and the African Union. As it is stipulated “On the coming 
into force of the Agreement, the government of the DRC, the armed opposition namely, the 
RDC and MLC as well as the unarmed opposition, shall enter into an open national dialogue. 
These inter-Congolese political negotiations involving les forces vives shall lead to a new 
political dispensation and national reconciliation in the DRC. The inter-Congolese political 
negotiation shall be under the guidance of a neutral facilitator to be agreed upon by the 
Congolese parties. All the parties commit themselves to supporting this dialogue and shall 
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ensure that the inter-Congolese political negotiations are conducted in accordance with the 
provision of chapter 5 of annex A”. (Lusaka Agreement, 1999) 
Meyer et al (2004:1458) stated that, in countries with strong political division like the DRC, 
sometimes violence halts or prevents transitional negotiations. Also, international pressure to 
resist violence was strong and stemmed from the rest of the world. Thus, the more 
homogenous the society, the less likely force was implemented. 
The first explicit use of a political opportunity framework, focused on the openness of 
belligerents in the DRC conflict, to express their concern about what they perceived to be in 
the interest of the country by accepting to be part of the Lusaka Accord to redress grievances. 
As pointed out Meyer et al (2004:1460), the basic premise of opportunity theory is that 
exogenous factors enhance or inhibit prospects for mobilization, for particular sorts of claims 
to be advanced rather than others, for particular strategies of influence to be exercised, and 
for movements to affect mainstream institutional politics and policy. Meyer et al admitted 
that political opportunity can affect changes in public policy through protest. 
3.2     Sun City Accords 
The Lusaka Agreement on chapter 5 called for national dialogue and reconciliation. In 
general, the Congolese parties expressed their firm will to put an end to the state of 
belligerence, the departure of the foreign troops, reconciliation between themselves and to 
establish a new political order in a united and sovereign Congo and their determination to 
work for the establishment of the rule of law (preparatory meeting for ICD, 2001). The 
Agreement also identified the Congolese parties who would take part in the dialogue and set 
out the principles to govern the dialogue process under a neutral mediator (Witman, 
2006:34).The inter-Congolese Dialogue had been decided by the Congolese parties to be held 
initially in Addis Ababa the capital of the African Union on the 15
th
 of October 2001, and the 
choice of the venue for dialogue was based on the following criteria: security guarantee for 
participants, availability of necessary infrastructure and acceptance or invitation by the host 
country (Report of UN secretary general, 2001). Some parties proposed that the dialogue 
should be held on Congolese soil. The ICD opened in Addis Ababa in October 2001, but 
could not finish its work due to problems of funds and disputes over the representation of 
parties (Mangu, 2002:462). The Congolese parties decided finally to accept the offer from 
South Africa to host the ICD there and to bear part of the funding problem. According to 
Rogier (2004:29), although the DRC government expressed reservations about South Africa, 
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which was accused of backing the RCD and their Rwandan supports, they decided to agree 
on South Africa as the country to host ICDI in Sun City where the name of Sun City Accord 
comes from. 
The negotiations in Sun City, South Africa in 2002 were an attempt to address the conflict 
and a number of principles to enable the country to launch from a new foundation were 
adopted. The Inter-Congolese Dialogue was intended to be a more inclusive peace 
conference, including civil society representatives and addressing broader concerns beyond 
the Cease-fire. These included elections as a way of accession into power; reform of the 
security sector for peace consolidation and the effective establishment of the rule of law 
throughout the country; and joint management of power to ensure gender equity in 
institutions of the country (Civil Society Monitoring report, 2011:91). 
3.2.1 The Effects of Inter-Congolese Dialogue on the Process of Democratization 
The DRC has been familiar with the kind of dialogue and conference needed to unite 
themselves and bring peace whenever there was disaccord since independence in 1960, e.g. 
the conference of Tananarive in 1962 which tried to unite central government and 
secessionist states of Katanga and Kasai including rebel movements (Martelli, 1966:85) and 
the famous national sovereign conference in 1990 which opened the first wave of the 
democratization process. For the majority of these conferences and dialogues, the result has 
been always mitigated and created for most of them an impasse.  
The Inter-Congolese Dialogue held initially in Addis Ababa and then in South Africa, in Sun 
City in 2002 was a success in many instances, despite the fact that it did not answer all the 
problems that the DRC was going through. However, it alleviated the situation of war and 
united belligerents, it mended the process of democratization which had derailed a long time 
ago, it broke the deadlock on the issue of power sharing during the transitional period. The 
Congolese parties and the facilitator, Sir Ketumile Masire, requested the president of South 
Africa to assist in the process of reaching an agreement.  President Mbeki worked together 
with the facilitator towards this end. After discussions with the component delegations, 
president Mbeki suggested two models of power sharing (Mangu, 2004:464). He submitted 
succinctly two plans related to the allocation of key power positions between Congolese party 
leaders during the transition period which raised controversies. 
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According to Rogier  (2004:32), the first plan called “Mbeki I” suggested a presidency to be 
held by Mr. Joseph Kabila, a high Council of the Republic comprising the president, RCD 
and MLC leaders as well as the prime minister, to be appointed by the political opposition. 
The Civil Society was offered the presidency of the parliament and meant to act as both a 
legislative and a constituent assembly. A special court was to serve as the constitutional court 
for the transition. Besides, independent institutions such as the Human Rights Commission, 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission, National Electoral Commission, and High Authority 
to regulate broadcasting were also considered of crucial importance during the transition. The 
defence, police, security and intelligence services were meant to be neutral and apolitical and 
the reserve bank autonomous. 
The second plan called “Mbeki II” attempted to address the criticism by putting the MLC and 
RCD leaders at the level of deputy presidents, each also holding an important portfolio. The 
first deputy president would be in charge of economy and finances while the second was to 
be responsible for defence, home affairs and elections. Mbeki II was amended in favour of 
RCD-Goma because it allegedly offended the Congolese Government and MLC. Those 
delegates dissatisfied with the outcome later formed an Alliance for the preservation of the 
Inter-Congolese Dialogue. 
Fundamentally, although the failure to reach a consensus at the level of power sharing 
between leaders of parties  for this first round of Inter-Congolese Dialogue, political debate 
remained democratic and the determination of each party to work on an all-inclusive 
agreement. 
3.3 Pretoria Accords 
The Pretoria Accords is the continuation and determinant phase of the Inter-Congolese 
Dialogue.  After the stalemate observed in Sun City by the parties to reach agreement on 
power sharing, the Pretoria Accords seemed to be as well an effort of three parties 
(personalities, organisations and countries involved in the mediation) to force parties back to 
the table of negotiation. One of methods used by the mediators was to convince countries that 
were backing the main rebel groups, to the importance of the withdrawal of their army in 
order for the Inter-Congolese Dialogue to move forward and also for peace within the region.  
As Rogier mentioned (2002:33-34), in July and September of 2002 respectively, separate 
agreements were conducted between the DRC and Rwanda in Pretoria as well as between the 
DRC and Uganda in Luanda, which prepared the way of the withdrawal of foreign forces 
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from the Congolese territory. The three parties did not only convince countries, who were 
backing main rebel groups, they went back to persuade belligerents of the necessity of 
continuing negotiations in order to reach agreement on power sharing.   
Some observers considered the Sun City Accord as a failure in negotiations, in the sense that 
it could not reach agreement on power sharing between belligerents (Rogier 2004, 32-34, 
Mangu, 2002, 465-466). In contradiction with these authors, this research recognizes the 
success of Sun City Accord in many ways, although the fact that, in any negotiation it is not 
easy between parties to agree in all points. Thirty four resolutions have been adopted and 
approved by consensus within commissions, and one of the most interesting innovations, was 
the fact that delegates agreed to put in place a certain number of new institutions to support 
democracy such as higher authority for media; a national observatory for human rights; the 
committee on ethics and the fight against corruption; an independent electoral commission; a 
truth and reconciliation commission (Pretoria Accord, 2002). These commissions were very 
important for the rebuilding of the DRC. 
As the main Congolese parties to the conflicts finally signed the Global and All-inclusive 
Agreement on power sharing and transition in the DRC, Pretoria Accords addressed the 
causes of conflicts and came up with consensus between main parties on power sharing at the 
governmental level during a 24 month transition period, which at the end, elections were 
supposed to be held. According to the Global and All- inclusive Agreement on power 
sharing, Kabila remained Head of state, assisted by four vice-presidents coming from 
different main rebel groups. Thus, Azarias Ruberwa has been chosen to represent RCD as 
deputy president of the DRC in charge of political commission, Jean Pierre Bemba 
representing MLC as deputy president in charge of economy and finance commission, 
Abdoulay Yerodia Ndombasi representing Kabila‟s government as deputy president in charge 
of reconstruction and development, Arthur Z‟ahidi Ngoma representing the political 
opposition as deputy president in charge of social and cultural commission. The accord 
provided that the transition government would include 36 ministers and 25 deputy ministers 
representing all stakeholders of the society. Furthermore, a parliament which will consist of a 
national assembly (with 500 members, led by an MLC representative), and a senate (with 120 
members led by the “forces vives”), will play a role of law makers creating unity and 
cohesion in the country. Although some sort of tension could be perceived between parties on 
the details of some crucial questions such as citizenship and the underground support of 
“negative forces”, parties showed commitment to the respect of decisions of the ICD. As 
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emphasized by Rogier (2002:37), the Pretoria Agreement could be described as “global and 
all- inclusive” in so far as the distribution of political privileges had been negotiated to the 
smallest detail among those stakeholders considered the major players. One of the 
achievements of ICD which boosted the process of democratization in the DRC was the 
transition process to the elections which started in 2003 with the installation of a government 
composed by representatives of the five main armed groups under the Global and All-
Inclusive Agreement. The conversion of signatories‟ from armed groups to political parties 










CHAPTER FOUR:   THE IMPACT OF REBELLIONS ON THE PROCESS OF  
                                                    DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE DRC 
4.1. Direct causes which favoured the second wave of rebellion in the DRC 
There are a certain number of events that took place in the DRC in 1990‟s, which can be 
directly considered as a cause of the second wave of rebellions. Most of the literature on 
DRC conflict highlights the genocide of Rwanda which took place in 1994 as a direct cause 
of conflict. This study considers the permissive aspect which characterized Mobutu‟s regime 
in the 1990‟s after the introduction of democratization as direct cause of conflict in the course 
of that process. As pointed out by Bratton and De Walle (1994: 453-489), the nature of a pre-
existing regime shapes the dynamics and outcomes of political transitions and they add that 
contemporary political changes are conditioned by mechanisms of rule embedded in the 
ancient regime. Authoritarian leaders in power for long periods of time establish rules about 
who may participate in public decisions and the amount of political regime. The long 
authoritarian reign of Mobutu‟s regime starting from 1965 to 1997 had left the country with 
ethnic favouritism and a paralyzed economy which created frustration among political elitist 
leaders. In 1990 with the wave of democracy which did not leave the DRC behind, it forced 
Mobutu to embark on a process of democratization which militated for multipartism, while 
opposition parties found themselves thrown into an impasse orchestrated by Mobutu as he 
was not willing to leave power. In the conquest of a new power base, started to exploit the 
long existing tension among different communities. As Solomon emphasized (2003:4), in 
seven years preceding the Great Lakes crisis, Mobutu, the president of Zaire, had been forced 
by Western powers to agree to at least some semblance of democracy, the result was 
catastrophic. The army, more a collection of things than a fighting force, went on two 
disastrous looting and pillaging sprees in the early 1990‟s, looting most of the modern 
business sector. As it is mentioned above, the genesis of the rebellion crisis in the DRC is 
linked to the authoritarianism of Mobutu‟s regime which created frustration among political 
elitists and left the majority of people desperate about their future. The 1990 wave of 
democratization was an opportunity for the DRC to shift from an authoritarian system to 
democractic system; unfortunately Mobutu‟s regime was capable of putting in place 
dispositive that would not allow a total transformation of his regime to democracy. Short- 
lived government succeeded one another until 1992 when the Sovereign National Conference 
was held. The conference was to put the country on the road towards democracy, by forming 
a provisional legislative body and an electoral commission as well as formulating a 
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transitional constitution. It is important to note that with regard to the NSC; that although this 
attempt at restoring the popular vote and the rule of law did not succeed in establishing 
democracy and social progress in the country, it did, nonetheless, leave a significant 
democratic legacy. This can be clearly seen in the awakening of a national conscience and the 
affirmation of the right to protest against the abuse of power (Zongola, 2006: 226).  Mobutu 
used the loopholes in the transitional charter to manipulate and obstruct the new institutions; 
parallel government and parliament were formed, effectively blocking the country. This 
standstill was filled with violence and foreign intervention, until the time where the country 
embarked on a war of liberation with the first wave of rebellion starting in 1996 and 
continuing to 1997, resulting in the final disappearance of Mobutu from the Congolese 
political scene and the ascent of Laurent Kabila to the presidential post. 
 The second rebellion of 1998 resulting in the defection of AFDL also called “The African 
War”, started in August 1998 until 2003, when a peace agreement was accepted by major 
warring sides (Zagel, 2010:98-118). As mentioned by Olzak (1998:187-217), a political 
competition is more likely to occur under conditions of political flux, when earlier political 
systems are breaking down and new forms are being built. The breakdown of Mobutu‟s 
regime opened the way to a transition which found difficulty in reaching unanimity on the 
principles of new regime. Bratton and Walle (1994: 453-455) pointed out that, Regime type 
influences both increased the likelihood that an opposition will arise and flexibility with 
which incumbents can respond. It also determines whether elites and the masses can arrive at 
new rules of political interaction through negotiations, accommodation, and election that is 
whether any transition will be democratic. The root causes of rebellions could be found only 
in the authoritarian regime of Mobutu, which did not tolerate any political parties challenging 
the system. The main parties involved in conflict have tried with variable success to work on 
the excesses of the DRC conflict. It is important to acknowledge the profound transformation 
of the DRC‟s political system which followed was followed by multiple negotiations and 
agreements after the second wave of rebellion in 1998. Some progress had already been 
made, especially after the signing of the Lusaka Agreement. Over the last several years, the 
DRC has moved from political instability caused by civil war which in turn was provoked by 
rebellions, to relative political stability and steps being taken towards democracy. The 
Congo‟s political transition was pursued notably through a combined strategy of political and 
military power-sharing which consisted of an extended  negotiations between Congolese 
belligerents and the unarmed opposition on the one hand in the so called Inter-Congolese 
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Dialogue, and profound reform of political and military institutions on the other hand which 
paved the way for democratization ( Raeymaekers, 24-27). 
4. 2. The Relationship between Rebellion and Democratization in the DRC 
Recent scholarly work suggests that another global trend, democratization, may be partially 
responsible for the rise of rebellion (Vorrath et al, 2001:8). The insecurity of transition, the 
use of ethnic nationalism by elites, and the majority rules of democracy, poses a threat to 
minorities who have attempted to identify the effects of democratization on rebellion. The 
relationship between rebellion and democratization remains contentious in political debate as 
we saw previously in preliminary literature; which tends to provide a framework which 
explains the paradox between rebellion and democratization. Democratization provides 
certain incentive and opportunity for political actors to somewhat cause destabilization. . It is 
very important to note in the DRC it was through the process of democratization that the 
rebellion arose and it was through the same process that rebellion was being eradicated,   via 
the Lusaka Agreement signed in 1999. Vorrath et al (2007:8-11) in their description of 
democratization, mentioned that the opening of the political arena means that formerly 
marginalized or suppressed groups have the opportunity to mobilize and organize new actors 
and movements to occupy public space while old ones normally transform or disappear. The 
announcement of multipartism by President Mobutu in his speech on the 24
th
 of April 1990 
saw the rise of a new political leader in the DRC and new political movements. Certain 
events that followed, hindered the process of democratization, such as the manipulation of 
opposition political party leaders by Mobutu pointed out by Mangu (2004:421). Mobutu 
managed to confiscate or “hijack” the discourse for change that was, so far, monopolized by 
the members of the democratic movement namely, the political party leaders and civil society 
and by the incredible political turn. He suddenly regained everything that had been promised 
by manipulating political leaders in his favour. This behaviour by Mobutu started creating 
frustration and goal became saving democratization by any means by the opposition.  
 The process of democratization in the DRC had been accompanied all along by conflicts 
mediation and agreement since it has been initiated in 1990 by Mobutu, and the most recent 
conflicts which this research focuses on, are rebellions that occurred in 1996 and in 1998, 
which deeply influenced  the process of democratization. The question of the impact of 
rebellions on the process of democratization has been at the forefront of international political 
debate since the signing of the Lusaka Accord in 1999. It has been widely acknowledged the 
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difficulties that the DRC encountered in their transition from an autocratic governed country 
to a democratically governed country, were due to the complexity of its situation. Rebellion 
had exercised a profound influence on the DRC‟s political development until the 
establishment of transitional institutions and then to the first presidential and legislative 
elections in 2006. There is dichotomy between rebellion and democratization, as stated by 
Morrison (2004:6); many of the factors that contribute to democratization also contribute to 
increases in conflict in heterogeneous societies. As countries transition from authoritarian to 
democratic regimes, marginalized minority groups experience decreased repression as an 
opportunity for ethnic mobilization or true nationalism arises.  . 
As Morrisson states (2004:7) the relationship between democratization and rebellion is most 
likely curvilinear, violence is possibly in the early stages of democratization, when repressed 
voices are allowed to be heard but competition has not been fully institutionalized. The DRC 
has been torn between authoritarianism on the one hand and constitutionalism and democracy 
on the other since the beginning of the democratization process in 1990. From Mobutu who 
initiated the process of democratization and tried by every means possible to block it by 
dividing the political opposition to prolong his reign, by Laurent Kabila who completely re-
instated an authoritarian regime by banning the activities of political parties and confiscating 
all powers back into his hands, which created a general frustration and opened the door to the 
deadliest rebellion of 1998, to Joseph Kabila who activated the Lusaka Agreement. The DRC 
has not yet embarked on the road to democracy. 
4.3. Rebellions in the DRC: Hindrance to the process of Democratization 
Recent global increases in rebellion and the negative impact that violent rebellion has had on 
the process of democratization, calls for an examination of factors that contribute to conflict. 
This section focuses on an empirical assessment of the negative aspects of rebellion on the 
process of democratization in the DRC. At different levels, rebellions have generated 
alternative ways of gaining profit or loss, power and protection with the local, political and 
economic framework in complete tatters and the region crammed with small arms, the 
absence of any authority capable of regulating economic, political and social competition has 
further incited the militarization of economic relations and has also brought about some 
important change in local, organisational, economic, political and social space. 
The composition and recruitment of members of rebellions have been based on the criteria of 
ethnicity in most of the cases in the DRC, which is the reason why the majority of authors on 
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DRC conflict labelled it “ethnic rebellion” and is always follow by conflict. E.g. Conflict 
which erupted in Butembo between Hema and Lendu resulted in thirty thousand civilians to 
flee (Prunier, 2009:227). Political Elite played a preponderant role in the events of1990‟s of 
the determination of the process of democratization in the DRC in which rebellions can be 
traced. As Snyder (2000) argued in his perception of Elite persuasion theory that, nationalism 
is weak or absent until democratization begins and elites begin to use nationalist appeals to 
secure their position. This was not the case for the majority of political leaders in the DRC. 
As noted by Prunier (2009:172), in both Kivu, were densely populated and ethnically 
fragmented provinces where access to the land had created major political problems and 
political leaders used that ethnic fragmentation to gain the trust of the local people as long as 
they saw in them the ability to protect them against invaders. Vlassenroot and 
Acker(2001:51-77) noted that, the aspect of stratification; political loyalty and regular 
recycling of the political elite, encouraged Mobutu in the nineties with the push for 
democratization, the exit-strategies based on ethnic criteria. Elite persuasion posits that 
democratization can lead to ethnic conflict (Morrison 2001). The Rwandan refugee crisis of 
1994 and the subsequent ethnic conflicts further reinforced the view that violence was based 
on ethnicity and carried out by groups of mobile members who had become the dominant 
principle to affect structural change (Vlassenroot and Acker (2001:55). Nationalism provides 
a doctrine by which elites can rule in the name of the people but not necessarily by the 
people. It provides a way for elites to be popular without being fully democratic. The context 
of state disintegration in the DRC and on going insecurity orchestrated by elites in order to 
gain popularity in their respective communities encouraged the formation of new and 
militarized networks organized by local elites which are not in line with nationalism. The 
local members of the DRC and MLC groups were predominantly Banyamulenge (Congolese 
Tutsi), divided largely by locality and allegiance to particular leaders; the Mai-Mai, Hema 
and Lendu who were indigenous Congolese groups were also involved in that on going 
conflict, and as a consequence, many indigenous Congolese had become increasingly 
suspicious and left threatened by the inflow of Kinyarwanda speakers (Banyamulenge and 
Banyaruanda) from Rwanda and Burundi (Gross, 2007:132). Such nationalist appeals by 
elites provoke violent conflict if the excluded group has the ability to resist marginalization, 
the case in point of Banyaruanda-speaking populations of Eastern Congo who have been 
almost totally blocked from political debate during the Mobutu years (Prunier, 2009:172). 
Rebellion in the DRC has been a hindrance to the process of democratization for it 
contributed to the delay of hope of the Congolese who, after the horror of Mobutu‟s regime, 
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were hungry to see and live in a democratic era. That hope had been removed by rebellion 
and civil war which left many people dead, infrastructure destroyed, a country divided and an 
economy paralyzed. As Gross emphasizes (2007:83) by April 2003, the war in the DRC had 
taken more lives than any other since world war II in what was described as the deadliest 
documented conflict in African history; at least 3.3 million people were killed in excess of 
what would normally be expected during a time of war. 
The kind of rebellion that eroded the Eastern DRC challenges the traditional notion that 
popular violence ought to promote democratization in a country haunted by an authoritarian 
regime. Social fragmentation in the Eastern DRC is the outcome of a long process that 
resulted in a different economic use of the available space and the mobility of labour within it 
(Vlassenroot and Acker, 2001:53). The gradual reorganization of that space from the arrival 
of new competitors‟ through politics and market, such as Rwandan speakers after the 
genocide of 1994, aggravated the situation and created a sort of competition. Considering 
rebellions as a hindrance to the process of democratization, Competition theory as it has been 
applied to ethnic conflict, Olzak (1992, 1998) suggests that rather than inequality causing 
conflict, the increase in competition that results from declining inequality promotes conflict. 
The main idea of this theory is that ethnic conflicts erupt when ethnic inequality and racially 
ordered systems break down. Since urbanization brings diverse groups into close proximity 
and intense competition with each other for the first time, it causes conflict, and such conflict 
solidifies ethnic boundaries.  This perspective is also tested in terms of political competition. 
If it is true that increased competition over jobs in the context of urbanization leads to 
conflict, it follows logically that perhaps increased competition over political resources in the 
context of democratization also leads to conflict. Thus, competition theory suggests that 
urbanization and democratization will each lead to greater rebellion. Political competition 
suggests furthermore that, the emerging plurality of actors generates competition over 
constituencies and resources. Urbanization and democratization are measured with changed 
scores. Rebellion has been used in the DRC by some leaders as a key reference for identity, 
and in which the struggle for power by all means it is a key objective for establishing 
rebellion. In order to grab rank of commandment into the political and economical sphere for 
their own interest, people engage in rebellion for ethnic power or for economic interest 
without any realistic vision for change. Sometimes, it is to gain territories as a tactic to sit in 
on negotiations no matter how destructive it is to the economy and people lives. VlassenRoot 
and Raemaekers (2004:395), pointed out that the political strategies of rebellions have been 
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overshadowed by a deeper historical division of the Eastern DRC between ethnic conflict and 
between strongmen over political and economic control. 
Two aspects need more attention. Firstly, patterns of elite formation have changed seriously 
since the conflict in the DRC, due to the fact that there isn‟t any political framework for 
organizing the social and economic interaction while leaders have surfaced making use of the 
existing situation of insecurity to strengthen their control over mineral resources and 
reinforce their grip on the population. However, as exemplified by the crisis where the 
Eastern DRC continued to be plagued by recurrent waves of rebellion, and chronic 
humanitarian crises and human rights violations, including sexual and gender-based violence. 
Contributing to the cycles of violence, have been the continued presence of Congolese armed 
groups taking advantage of power and security vacuums in the Eastern part of the country; 
the illegal exploitation of resources; interference by neighbouring countries and pervasive 
impunity; all these constituted a hindrance to the process of democratization. 
4.4 Rebellions in the DRC: Catalyst to the Process of Democratization 
It is not our objective to promote or make a create publicity of rebellion; its effects being 
disastrous in all aspects on the process of democratization which we already mentioned in the 
previous chapter. The aim of this chapter is to highlight the catalytic aspect that has lead to 
the spread of rebellions in the DRC which in some way, boosted the process of 
democratization that was derailing the region since its establishment in the 1990‟s, and came 
into effect from the signing of Lusaka Agreement by all main rebel groups and central 
government. As the researcher stated in chapter one, in essence, rebellions in the DRC did not 
only want to topple the central government, but it also wanted to  push the central 
government to open the way to the process of democratization, according to the declaration 
of their leaders while they were capturing territories in the DRC . Rebellions in the DRC 
imposed significant pressure on the central government, which also pushed the International 
Community not only to initiate a dialogue between parties in conflict and to progress  
towards the Lusaka Agreement, but also to the enhance the process of democratization in the 
DRC. Beyond the known destructive aspect of the rebellion, it‟s created an opportunity to 
advance democracy and the social and economic interests of the people in the DRC. 
Political opportunity theory suggests that the more democratic a country is, the less rebellion 
there will be. Rebellion appeared in the DRC as result of many long years of authoritarian 
rule enforced both by Mobutu‟s and Kabila‟s regime characterized by terror and anarchy. As 
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Koko stated (1999, 35), the Lusaka Accord established the framework that would later be 
utilized in the inter-Congolese dialogue. According to article 19 of the Lusaka Ceasefire 
agreement, the armed opposition, the RCD and MLC and the unarmed opposition were to 
engage in open national dialogues with the objective of a negotiated settlement to end the war 
in the DRC, and to revive and consolidate the process of democratization.  In chapter 5 of 
Lusaka Ceasefire agreement, annex A, it says: 
 5.1 On the coming into force of the ceasefire agreement in the inter-Congolese political negotiations which should be 
recalled to a new political dispensation in the DRC.  
5.2 In order to arrive at a new political dispensation and national reconciliation arising from the inter-Congolese political 
negotiations, the parties agree upon the implementation of the following principles:  
a) The Inter-Congolese process shall include beside the Congolese parties, namely the government of the DRC, the 
Congolese Rally for Democracy and the Movement for the Liberation of Congo, the political opposition as well as 
representatives of the Forces vives.  
b) All the participants in the Inter-Congolese political negotiations shall enjoy equal status, c) all the resolutions adopted by 
the inter-Congolese political negotiations shall be binding on all the participants…. 
These negotiations were crucial in the formulation of a consensual and all-inclusive 
transitional dispensation, making it possible for the first multiparty elections in the DRC in 
forty one years.  Political Opportunity Theory focuses on the political context in which 
rebellion occurs (Jenkins 1985; McAdam 1982; Tarrow 1989; Schock 1996). It assumes that 
grievances are inherent and that there isn‟t variation in individuals‟ actual position or status 
that influences their decision to engage in unconventional politics, but rather the availability 
to affect conventional means of participation. As Salomon (2003:23) observed, the Inter-
Congolese Dialogue was hampered when the MLC rebels proposed a presidency that 
revolved every three years, that the seat of prime minister should be given to the unarmed 
political opposition, and that the presidency of the parliament should be allotted to the Forces 
vives de la nation. The DRC government immediately rejected the proposal and the MLC 
promptly declared that it was no longer interested in attending another meeting. If effective 
conventional means of influencing the government are available, individuals will choose 
them over the higher risk, higher cost non-conventional methods of participation. The Lusaka 
Accord represented a significant breakthrough in the resolution of conflict between rebellions 
and central government, which allowed the DRC to re-embark on the process of 
democratization which was derailed.  Firstly, because Mobutu‟s manipulation of political 
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party leaders, and secondly, because Laurent Kabila‟s authoritarianism during the first wave 
of rebellion in 1996. 
Political Opportunity Theory would have expected less rebellion as political rights increase 
and alternative means to influence politics are made available. It was noticed during the 
transitional period which followed the Inter-Congolese Dialogue, the increase of political 
rights and freedom of expression extended to all belligerents, which had a positive effect on 
the unity of the DRC‟s territory and consolidation of peace despite some areas where there 
was resistance. The most rebellion occurs where political rights are the lowest, and the level 
of rebellion declines as political rights increase. Rebellion is thought to negatively affect 
democracy because it consolidates ethnic bonds, reinforces ethnic differences, and 
contributes to the potential for “authoritarian reflex.” I find that rebellion does have a 
negative effect on democracy, but can force an authoritarian regime to democratization and 
that the effect varies according to the organization of rebellion and their ability to pressurize 
the government to agree to their demands, and also when the government has a capacity to 
contain rebellion, it will push out the rebellion and won‟t accept their demands. According to 
Koko ( 1999,36), though cases of fighting were registered after the signing of Lusaka 
Agreement, it worked as a psychological tool for the belligerents by “de-constructing” the 
notion of armed and military confrontation to ensure victory, and it created opportunity to 
realize other options. Democratization does not seem to increase ethnic rebellion. In fact, 
democratization has led to less ethnic rebellion. It may also be that democratization leads to a 
very short term increase in rebellion, but a long term decline and the second point is a direct 
consequence of the first. All three examined points are inherent in the democratization 
process and thus signify possible drawbacks for a peaceful transition, but these aspects of 
democratization take place against a specific background in a country and region (Vorrath et 
al, 2007:8-11).  Significant progress has been achieved in the Democratic Republic of the 
Congo in the past 10 years. Through the process of democratization, the transitional 
government and all institutions of support to democracy have been established, the national 
territory was reunited, and foreign armed forces formally withdrew in accordance with the 
Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement of 1999. The Inter-Congolese Dialogue culminated in the 
signature of the Global and Inclusive Agreement on the 17th of December 2002, in Pretoria, 
South Africa. On the basis of this political agreement, a Constitution had been adopted and 
promulgated on the 4th April 2003, thus allowing the establishment of a transitional 
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Government comprising all the warring parties, the political opposition and civil society 
(Ministry of Human Rights, DRC, 2007:7). 
The overall economic situation has continued to improve significantly over the past 14 years, 
with an average economic growth rate of 6.5 per cent per year, a major decrease in inflation, 
increasing government domestic revenues, effective fiscal deficit control and the cancellation 
of debt under the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative. 
The western and central parts of the Democratic Republic of the Congo have generally 
stabilized, with the main challenges there relating to post-conflict reconstruction and long-
term peace building. In the East, in particular Orientale Province and Kivus, efforts to address 
the threat of armed groups and to extend State authority have resulted in the relative 
stabilization of most of the Ituri district and the significant degradation of the capacities of 
foreign armed groups, including the Forces démocratiques de liberation du Rwanda (FDLR) 
and the Lord‟s Resistance Army (LRA).The Government intends to launch the stabilization 
and reconstruction plan for war-affected areas aimed at, inter alia, improving security, re-
establishing the authority of the State and supporting the return and reintegration of refugees 
and internally displaced persons and socio-economic recovery. 
The recurrence of such cycles of violence continues to be an obstacle to peace in the 
Democratic Republic of the Congo and threatens the overall stability and development of the 
Great Lakes region. In the past, national, regional and international efforts have for the most 
part succeeded in addressing the immediate manifestations of crises, but not the core reasons 
for their eruption. In order to break such cycles and ensure that sustainable peace takes hold 
in the country and the wider region, a new, comprehensive approach that addresses the 




CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
The present research attempted to analyse the impact of rebellions on the process of 
democratization in the DRC. The research focused on the hindrance and catalytic aspects of 
rebellion with more emphasis on the catalytic aspect. 
The research hypothesis stated thus that rebellion in the DRC played a catalytic role in posing 
significant pressure against central government, which served not only to open dialogue 
between parties in conflict and to make a way for the “Lusaka agreement”, also the 
enhancement of the process towards democratization in the DRC. 
 
This present academic research hopes to contribute to the field of political science, peace and 
conflict studies by looking at other ways of observing rebellions beyond it disastrous aspects 
on the transformation of society. 
Therefore, this last chapter intends to sum up the main points of the research and draw from 
the latter a conclusion and recommendations. The chapter is subsequently divided into two 
main parts. The first section consists of a summary highlighting some of the key points raised 
in this research. The second section is a conclusion and some recommendations from 
academic point of view. 
5.1 Summary 
 
Indisputably, rebellions and the process of democratization features as the most controversial 
and discussed subject in political science. This is one challenging intellectual research to the 
realization of which this research intends to make a contribution. 
The discussion is far from over and can never end, with the oscillating relationship between 
rebellion and the democratization process. African countries have engaged seriously in the 
democratization process since the wave of the 1990‟s and the struggle has continued against 
authoritarian regimes which has occurred in many forms, one being armed rebellion with the 
objective of forcing authoritarian regimes to engage in the democratization process.  
This research is a perennial one and the struggle remains somehow a perpetual business, 
although in the case of the DRC, the signing of the Lusaka agreement by all belligerents was 
supposed to be the end of conflict. For the sake of democratization, rebellions have been 
launched and operating to root out incumbent authoritarian regimes. the struggle continued in 
several ways whether to get rid of authoritarian regimes or to push them to materialize their 
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promise for democratization which has been zigzagging and got long to reach common 
ground on the principles of democracy. 
This research on the impact of rebellions on the process of democratization is aware of the 
fact that findings and conclusions could be partial and concern only the objectives outlined in 
this research project. 
considering the DRC as a case study, this study intended through historical stages and 
experiences of the process of democratization, getting along with armed rebellion, to 
establish whether rebellions constituted a blocked road to the process of democratization or 
whether it helped to overcome the manoeuvres of incumbent authoritarian regimes which 
took place in the DRC from the time of Mobutu and Kabila, consisting of manipulation of the 
democratization process in order to remain in power. 
Chapter two aimed to provide a literature review framework of rebellions: hindrance or 
catalyst to the process of democratization in the DRC, and concepts related to it such as 
violence, conflict, and civil war, because these terms accompanied the events all along which 
occurred in the DRC.  The chapter looked at the dialectic existing between them and their 
auxiliary concepts. It highlighted as well, some general considerations surrounding the 
democratization process and the state of the process in the DRC, since the speech of Mobutu 
in 1990 which led at the very minimum to the restoration of liberal democracy. The chapter 
ends with the state of rebellions in the DRC.  It has noticed that rebellions in their actions, 
aimed effectively to overthrow and destabilize central government accused of an 
authoritarian regime, in order to gain chairs into negotiations. 
Chapter three attempted to focus on contradictory debates of the UN intervention and the 
uprising of rebellions in the DRC followed by a brief comparison between UN intervention in 
the DRC in 1960 and UN intervention in 1999 to now. 
Chapter four dealt with direct causes which favoured the second wave of rebellions in the 
DRC which could be found in the number of events that took place in 1990‟s such as the 
permissive aspects which characterized Mobutu‟s regime.  
So the genesis of rebellions is linked to the authoritarianism of Mobutu‟s regime. It explained 
furthermore how rebellions constituted a hindrance to the process of democratization in the 
DRC, the ethnic characteristic of rebellions did not facilitate the normal pursuit of the 
process. The chapter goes on to explain the catalytic aspect of rebellion when its objective of 
toppling the central government could not be realized, and the government could not get rid 
of rebellions, both sides started to value the importance of negotiations which were summed 
up in the Lusaka cease fire agreement on power sharing and the installation of democratic 
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institutions. Since rebellion is made or constructed it can be deconstructed. the answers to the 
dilemma posed by rebellion and forces of its deconstruction must lie in structural changes, 
which address political social and economic inequality and democratization. . as argued 
previously, it was beyond the known destructive aspect of rebellions that arose the 
opportunity of advancing the process of democratization in the DRC. 
 
5.2 Recommendations 
The history of the impact of rebellions on the process of democratization in the DRC remains 
to be written. The construction of democracy in the DRC needs to be fully documented and 
the silence of political elite to address rebellions is still overwhelming DRC political 
development. 
This study did not pretend to analyse all challenges and make all recommendations for the re-
establishment and consolidation of democratization. therefore, a number of research 
questions that are left unanswered or are not well addressed, would need further research and 
investigation by other researchers of rebellions and the process of democratization in DRC in 
particular and Africa in general. 
There is a need for further involvement of the international community to help the DRC in 
the process of democratization which is the best way to eradicate armed rebellions, violent 
conflicts and the political elites should promote nationalism in the sense of cultivating unity 
among people rather than promoting fragmentation. The intricate rebellion configuration and 
militarism in DRC‟s politics lies in their historical construction and continued reproduction 
since independence in 1960. Rebellion has been based on cognition of different levels of 
identity, clan, village, tribe, region or nationality. Pluralism in itself is not problematic except 
when certain groups perceive that they are being excluded from what they consider to be their 
rights, whether political, economic or linguistic such as the Banyamulenge. 
moreover, as pointed out earlier, many existing studies on rebellions and their impact on  the 
process of democratization are more focused on negative aspects of rebellions, there is a need 
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